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Case No. 20100840-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff / Appellee,
vs.

JAMES ERROL CAMPBELL,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his conviction for one count of possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 5837-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2011).1 This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e)(West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court err in denying Defendant's request for an instruction on
the purportedly lesser included offense of misdemeanor possession of drug
paraphernalia?

1

The drug possession and drug paraphernalia statutes were amended
after Campbell's crime in December 2009, but the changes do not affect this case.
Therefore, unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to the West 2011
supplement.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Standard of review. A "trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction is a
question of law, reviewed for correctness." State v. Burke, 2011 UT App 168, ^[18,
256 P.3d 1102.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes are included in Addendum A:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2011) (controlled substance
possession);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37a-3 to -5 (West Supp. 2011) (drug paraphernalia);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402 (West 2004) (included offenses).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant, James Errol Campbell, with one count of
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). At trial, Campbell's counsel asked the trial court to
instruct the jury on the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. R.202:127-28
(a copy of the relevant transcript pages is included in Addendum B). The trial
court denied the request. R.202:130-31 (Add. B). The jury convicted Campbell as
charged. R.188,192-91. The trial court sentenced Campbell to zero to five years
in the Utah State Prison with credit for time served. R.194-93. Campbell timely
~>~~ry~>1r*A

~Q 1 Q £
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In December 2009, Campbell had an outstanding warrant for his arrest.
R.202:99-100. Police Officers Laursen and Hubband found Campbell in a Provo
home and arrested him. R.202:88-89,102. Before conducting a search incident to
the arrest, Officer Hubbard asked Campbell if he had any weapons or needles.
R.202:102. Campbell responded that he "may have a needle on him/7 R.202:102.
Officer Hubbard searched Campbell. R.202:89, 102. He did not find a
needle, but did find a contact lens case. R.102:102, 106. Inside the case was a
cotton ball with a brown substance on it. R.202:90, 103. The officers7 training
and experience led them to believe that the substance was heroin. R.202:92,10405.
Lab tests confirmed that the substance on the cotton ball was heroin.
R.202:114, 124. The tests did not detect the presence of any other substance.
R.202:122.

The lab technician described the substance as heroin "residue77

because the amount was so small she that could not separate it from the cotton or
weigh it independently. R.202.119-20.
The officers explained at trial that heroin users typically heat solid heroin
until it liquefies and then use a cotton ball to strain the liquid as they draw it into
a syringe before injecting it. R.202:92-93, 96, 105, 107-08. The cotton filters
impurities and any pieces of heroin that have not completely liquefied. R.202:92-
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93, 96, 105, 107-08. Users "don't want a chunk getting into [their] veins/7
R.202:107. Officer Hubbard also explained that heroin users "generally hang on
to the cotton so that they can get the heroin out of [it] later/' R.202:107.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly denied Campbell's request for an instruction on
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia in this trial for felony possession
of a controlled substance. Under State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (1983), Campbell
had to satisfy a two-part test to be entitled to the instruction. He had to show
that: (1) the elements of the two crimes overlapped, and (2) there is a rational
basis in the evidence for acquitting him of felony drug possession and convicting
him of misdemeanor paraphernalia possession. Campbell demonstrates no error
in the trial court's ruling that he failed to satisfy this test.
Campbell demonstrates no overlap between the elements of the two
crimes. Rather, he claims only that the evidence in this case proved both crimes.
But Baker requires overlapping statutory elements, not just overlapping evidence.
The elements of the two statutes do not overlap because they require possession
of entirely different objects. The elements of felony drug possession require
possession of a controlled substance, while the elements of misdemeanor
paraphernalia possession require possession of an object that qualifies as drug
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paraphernalia.

Because the two statutes share no overlapping elements,

Campbell cannot satisfy Baker's first prong.
Campbell does not satisfy Baker's second prong, because he fails to show a
rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting him of drug possession and
convicting him of paraphernalia possession. Campbell theorizes in his brief that,
although he admittedly used the cotton ball to strain his heroin, the jury could
have found that he did not knowingly and intentionally possess the heroin
residue left in the cotton ball because he reasonably believed that he had used the
entire amount of heroin. However, Campbell did not advance this theory at trial
through either his own testimony or his counsel's closing argument. Rather,
defense counsel argued that there was no evidence that Campbell had ever used
heroin. Therefore, this theory did not provide a rational basis for acquitting him
of felony drug possession.
In any event, the defense theory articulated for the first time in Campbell's
brief does not negate the element of knowing and intentional possession; rather,
it establishes that element.

Under Campbell's theory, he knowingly and

intentionally possessed and used a quantity of heroin sometime before his arrest.
His mistaken belief that he used up all of that heroin did not end his knowing
and intentional possession of the heroin that remained in the cotton ball. Rather,
his possession continued until he rid himself of the entire amount of heroin that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he originally admittedly possessed.

Moreover, the evidence established that

Campbell could not have reasonably believed that the cotton would not retain
some heroin residue where Officer Hubbard testified that solid pieces of heroin
can remain in cotton used to strain heroin and users keep the cotton to later
recover that heroin.

Thus, under Campbell's theory, the only rational

interpretation of the evidence was that he was guilty of both crimes.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATES NO ERROR IN THE TRIAL
COURTS REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON
PARAPHERNALIA POSSESSION
At his trial for felony possession of a controlled substance, Campbell's
counsel argued that misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia was a lesser
included offense and asked the court to instruct the jury on that crime. R.202:128
(a copy of the relevant transcript pages is included in Addendum B). The trial
court denied the request.

R.202:130~31 (Add. B). The court explained that

possession of drug paraphernalia was not a lesser included offense of possession
of a controlled substance, because proof that Campbell committed felony heroin
possession did not require proof that he also committed misdemeanor
paraphernalia possession. R.2Q2:130-31. That ruling was correct.
In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (1983), the Utah Supreme Court clarified the
standards for determining when a trial court must instruct a jury on a proposed
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lesser included offense. Different standards apply depending on which party
makes the request. See id. at 155-59. If the prosecution makes the request, "both
the legal elements and the actual evidence or inferences needed to demonstrate
those elements [of the lesser offense] must necessarily be included within the
original charged offense/7 Id. at 156. However, when a defendant makes the
request, "the instruction 'must be given if (i) the statutory elements of greater
and lesser included offenses overlap . . . and (ii) the evidence provides a rational
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting
him of the included offense/" State v. Sjrillers, 2007 UT 13, ^[12, 152 P.3d 315
(quoting State v. Hansen, 734: P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986)). In this case, the trial
court correctly denied Campbell's request because he did not satisfy either prong
of the Baker test.
A. The statutory elements of possession of a controlled substance
and possession of paraphernalia do not overlap.
Campbell argues that the elements of felony possession of a controlled
substance and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia overlap because
the same evidence proved both crimes. Br. Aplt. at 21. His argument fails,
however, because Baker requires more than just overlapping evidence. See Baker,
671 P.2d at 158-59. Rather, it also requires "some overlapping of the statutory
elements of the offenses." State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah 1984) (citing
Baker, 671 P.2d at 158-59).
7
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The supreme court explained in Baker that although the analysis of a
defendant's request for a lesser included offense instruction "begin[s] with the
proof of facts at trial," if does not end there. See 671 P.2d at 158. Rather, a court
must make "some reference to the statutory elements of the offenses involved" to
determine whether there is "some overlap in the statutory elements of allegedly
'included' offenses." See id. at 158-59 (emphasis in original). The court explained
that the requirement of overlapping statutory elements exists to prevent "totally
unrelated offenses" from being "deemed included simply because some of the
evidence necessary to prove one crime was also necessary to prove the other."
Id. at 159. For example, the court explained that "evidence proving theft in a trial
involving only a charge of first degree homicide would not make theft a lesser
included offense under § 76-1-402(3) (a) because none of the statutory elements of
theft and homicide overlap." Id.
In this case, possession of drug paraphernalia cannot be a lesser included
offense of possession of a controlled substance because there is no overlap in the
statutory elements of the two crimes. A defendant commits possession of a
controlled substance if he: (1) knowingly and intentionally (2) possesses or uses
(3) a controlled substance.2 UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). A defendant

2

The full text of the subsection states: "(a) [i]t is unlawful: (i) for any
person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
8
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commits possession of drug paraphernalia if he: (1) uses or possesses with intent
to use, (2) drug paraphernalia, (3) to contain, conceal, or inject a controlled
substance into the human body.3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l)(a). "Drug
paraphernalia'' includes "any . . . material used, or intended for use, to . . . store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body" in violation of the Controlled Substances Act.
Id. at § 58-37a-3. One consideration in determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia is "the existence of any residue of a controlled substance of the
object." Id. at § 58-37a-4(5).
As the trial court correctly found, the elements of the two statutes do not
overlap because the statutes require possession of completely different objects.
R.202:130-3I (Add. B).

Felony drug possession requires possession of a

controlled substance, while misdemeanor paraphernalia possession requires
possession of an object of drug paraphernalia. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-378(2)(a)(i), 58-37a-5(l)(a). Therefore, paraphernalia possession is not an included
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
the person's professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter."
UTAH CODE ANN. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i).
3

The full text of the subsection states: "[i]t is unlawful for any person to
use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate,
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale
or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation
of this chapter." UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l)(a).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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offense of felony drug possession under Baker because the elements of the two
crimes do not overlap. Rather, as the trial court recognized, the prosecution
could have charged both crimes, but instead chose to charge only one. R.202:13031 (Add. B).
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the elements of
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia do
not overlap. See State v. Williams, 2007 UT 98, f f 5-6, 22-23,175 P.3d 1029. The
State charged Williams with possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free
zone when an officer found a plastic bag with methamphetamine residue in
Williams's pocket. Id. at f 2. Williams argued that State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146
(Utah 1969), required the prosecution to charge only paraphernalia possession
"because the evidence could sustain a charge of either felony [drug] possession
or misdemeanor paraphernalia possession/' Id. at f 3. The Utah Supreme Court
rejected Williams's argument. Id. at ^ 6 , 1 9 . It held that the two statutes did not
punish identical conduct because, "[t]o be guilty of possession of a controlled
substance, one need not possess drug paraphernalia. Similarly, one may be
guilty of possessing drug paraphernalia while not being in possession of a
controlled substance/'' Id. at %6. The court concluded that the two statutes were
"separate and independent" and "obviously intended to be fully and separately
enforceable." Id. at ^ 2 2 , 2 3 .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Although Williams involved the application of the Shondel doctrine, rather
than an analysis of whether paraphernalia possession was an included offense of
drug possession, its holding is still relevant.

The Shondel doctrine analyzes

whether the elements of two statutes are "'wholly duplicative/" See Williams,
2007 UT 98 at f 14 (quoting State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985)). In
conducting that analysis in Williams, the supreme court identified no overlap
between the two statutes. See id. at |Tf6, 19, 22-23. Therefore, although not
dispositive, Williams supports the conclusion that paraphernalia possession is not
an included offense of felony drug possession under Baker's first prong because
the elements of the two statutes do not overlap.
Campbell contends that, based on the evidence in this case, the two crimes
satisfy the definition of included crimes in section 76-1-402(3)(a). Br. Aplt. at 21.
He argues that paraphernalia possession is an included crime under that section
because "the charge of paraphernalia would be 'established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of [drug]
possession." Br. Aplt. at 21 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(3)(a) (West
2004). Campbell is incorrect. His possession of drug paraphernalia could not be
"established by proof of the same or less than ail the facts required" to establish
felony drug possession. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(3)(a). As explained, the
only facts that were "required" to prove felony drug possession were that

11
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Campbell knowingly and intentionally possessed heroin.

See id. at § 58-37-

8(2)(a)(i). Those same facts do not establish paraphernalia possession. Rather, to
prove paraphernalia possession, the prosecution would also have to prove that
(1) the heroin was found on an object; and (2) Campbell used or intended to use
that object in conjunction with a controlled substance. See id. at § 58-37a-5(l)(a).
Regardless, even assuming that the same facts required to prove felony
drug possession somehow also proved misdemeanor paraphernalia possession,
those two crimes must share overlapping elements in order to satisfy the first
prong of the Baker test. See Baker, 671 P.2d at 158-59. As explained above, none
of the statutory elements overlap. Rather, the two crimes are "separate and
independent/ 7 Williams, 2007 UT 98, f 22. Therefore, Campbell does not satisfy
Baker's first prong. This Court should reject Campbell's claim on this basis alone.
B. There was no rational basis in the evidence to acquit of
possession of a controlled substance and convict of
paraphernalia possession.
Campbell also failed to satisfy Baker's second prong because he did not
show that "the evidence offered provides a 'rational basis for a verdict acquitting
[him] of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense/" See
Baker, 671 P.2d at 159 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402(4) (West 2004)).
Rather, Campbell's theory actually admits his guilt for both crimes.
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Campbell argues in his brief that there was a rational basis to acquit him of
heroin possession because, according to him, the evidence arguably created a
dispute about whether he knowingly and intentionally possessed the heroin
residue. Br. Aplt. at 23, 24. He reasons that, although the jury could have found
that he "used heroin at some earlier time" and "used the cotton ball to strain it,"
the jury could have also found that he "believed he no longer possessed any
heroin" because, given the very small amount of heroin residue that was left in
the cotton ball, he "likely believed it had all been used up." Br. Aplt. at 23, 24.
This theory does not establish a rational basis for acquitting Campbell of
heroin possession because Campbell did not present this theory at trial.
Campbell did not testify. R.202:132. Nor did his counsel argue this theory in her
closing argument. R.202:148-55 (a copy of defense counsel's closing argument in
included in Addendum C).

Defense counsel did not assert that Campbell

admittedly possessed and used heroin sometime before his arrest, and thought
that he had used it all up. See id. On the contrary, counsel argued that "[t]here's
no evidence that he had used heroin then, recently or ever." R.202:153 (Add. C).
Because the theory in Campbell's brief is not the theory he argued at trial, it
could not have provided a rational basis to acquit him of felony drug possession.
In any event, Campbell's new theory does not establish a rational basis for
acquitting him of heroin possession; rather, this theory admits his guilt for that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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crime. Campbell's mistaken belief that he had used all of his heroin before the
police arrested him does not negate the elements of knowing and intentional
possession, even if Campbell's belief were reasonable. Campbell's admission
that he used heroin by straining it through a cotton ball sometime before his
arrest necessarily admitted that he knowingly and intentionally possessed a
certain quantity of heroin. Campbell continued to knowingly and intentionally
possess that entire quantity of heroin until he rid himself of all of it. Although
Campbell claims that he reasonably believed he had used the entire amount of
heroin, he was mistaken. But his mistake, even if reasonable, did not negate the
fact that he continued to knowingly and intentionally possess the heroin that
remained in the cotton ball. Thus, Campbell's theory establishes his guilt for
possessing or using a controlled substance, not a rational basis to acquit him of
that charge.
In any event, the evidence established that Campbell could not have
reasonably believed that no heroin would remain in the cotton ball after he used
it to strain his liquefied heroin. Campbell argues that he could have reasonably
believed that all that remained in the cotton "is the impurities in the heroin," not
heroin itself. Br. Aplt. at 22. He bases his argument on the officers' testimony
that heroin users typically use cotton balls to "'filter out any impurities and
things other than heroin that the individual wanted to introduce into their

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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body/" Br. Aplt at 22 (quoting R.202:93). Campbell's belief is unreasonable,
however, because it is based on only selected portions of the officers' testimony.
Although both officers testified that heroin users strain liquid heroin
through a cotton ball to filter impurities, Officer Hubbard also explained that the
cotton has an additional use: filtering unliquefied pieces of heroin. R.202:93, 96,
107-08. He explained that users strain heroin through a cotton ball to prevent "a
chunk getting into [their] veins." R.202:107. He testified that the cotton is used
to "stop that transmission of those larger objects into the syringe." R.202:107. He
added that users "generally hang on to the cotton so that they can get the heroin
out of that later."

R.202:107-08.

Officer

Hubbard's testimony

was

uncontradicted.
Thus, the evidence established that while a cotton ball may filter
"impurities," it also filters solid pieces of heroin that will remain in the cotton
and that users later extract. When all of the evidence is considered, it establishes
that Campbell could not have reasonably believed that the cotton ball he had so
carefully saved in a contact lens case possessed only "impurities" rather than
residual heroin. Consequently, Campbell fails to show that there was a rational
basis in the evidence to acquit him of felony drug possession and convict him of
misdemeanor paraphernalia possession.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted 12 October 2011.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on 12 October 2011, two accurate copies of the
foregoing brief were |( mailed • hand-delivered to:
Margaret P. Lindsay
Douglas J. Thompson
Utah County Public Defender Association Appeals Division
51 South University Ave., #206
Provo,UT 84601
A digital copy of the brief w7as also included: ^ Yes • No
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2011). Prohibited acts - Penalties
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute;
or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results
in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c,
or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with
respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer,
supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a
controlled substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in
Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or
IV, or marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty
of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii)
or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate
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possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not
less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties:
/ ~ \ T4- 4~ , , - ^ 1 ~ ^ . T . C - . " l .
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(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner
while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as
otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building,
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those
locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Ajny person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second
degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than
16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent
to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
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(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii),
including a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2, or less than one ounce of
marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the
person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent
conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances
as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term
of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively
and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in
the person's body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent
manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the
death of another.
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body:
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(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those
described in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under
Schedule II is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in
Subsection 58-37-4 (2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 5837-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious
bodily injury or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation
of Subsection 58-37-8 (2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same
episode of driving.
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled
substance, to assume tKe title of, or represent oneself to be, a manufacturer,
wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other
authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to
any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or
to procure the administration of any controlled substance by
misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving any
controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception,
subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled
substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name,
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of
any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render
any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3) (a) is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D--Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this
section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58,
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject
to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact
finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds
ui

any

ui
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(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i)
and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of
where the act occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport,
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section
76-8-311.3.
(b)(i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the
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penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4)
would have been a first degree felony.
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would
have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person
convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not
apply to a violation of Subsection (2) (g).
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4) (a) (xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the
person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who,
acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense,
directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection
(4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of
the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as
described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(c), a
plea of guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance
under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction,
even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance
with the plea in abeyance agreement.
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(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section,
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this
chapter.
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not
in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for
the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or
substances.
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course
of the veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from
prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing
the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under the
veterinarian's direction and supervision.
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of
professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of
the officer's employment.
(12) (a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any
Indian, as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1) (v), who uses, possesses, or transports
peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(1) (w).
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as
defined in Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the
peyote was used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide
traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a
traditional Indian religion.
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(c)(i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an
affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not
later than 10 days prior to trial.
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice
for good cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the
lack of timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this
Subsection (12) by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is
established, it is a complete defense to the charges.
(13) (a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or
administered a controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person:
(i) was engaged in medical research; and
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under
Section 58-37-6.
(b) It is not a defense under Subsection (13) (a) that the person prescribed or
dispensed a controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2.
(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if:
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a
valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher.
(15) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be
given effect without the invalid provision or application.
(16) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that
is less restrictive than any provision of this chapter.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-3 (West Supp. 2011). "Drug paraphernalia" defined
As used in this chapter, "drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, or
material used, or intended for use, to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
package, repackage, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or to otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of Title 58,
Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, and includes, but is not limited to:
(1) kits used, or intended for use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing,
or harvesting any species of plant which is a controlled substance or from which
a controlled substance can be derived;
(2) kits used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, converting,
producing, processing, or preparing a controlled substance;
(3) isomerization devices used, or intended for use, to increase the potency of any
species of plant which is a controlled substance;
(4) testing equipment used, or intended for use, to identify or to analyze the
strength, effectiveness, or purity of a controlled substance;
(5) scales and balances used, or intended for use, in weighing or measuring a
controlled substance;
(6) diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannited,
dextrose and lactose, used, or intended for use to cut a controlled substance;
(7) separation gins and sifters used, or intended for use to remove twigs, seeds,
or other impurities from marihuana;
(8) blenders, bowls, containers, spoons and mixing devices used, or intended for
use to compound a controlled substance;
(9) capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, or intended for use
to package small quantities of a controlled substance;
(10) containers and other objects used, or intended for use to store or conceal a
controlled substance;
(11) hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, or intended for use to
parenterally inject a controlled substance into the human body, except as
provided in Section 58-37a-5; and
(12) objects used, or intended for use to ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body, including but not limited to:
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(a) metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or
without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal
bowls;
(b) water pipes;
(c) carburetion tubes and devices;
(d) smoking and carburetion masks;
(e) roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, such as a
marihuana cigarette, that has become too small or too short to be held in the
hand;
(f) miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials;
(g) chamber pipes;
(h) carburetor pipes;
(i) electric pipes;
(j) air-driven pipes;
(k) chillums;
(1) bongs; and
(m) ice pipes or chillers.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-4 (West Supp. 2011). Considerations in determining
whether object is drug paraphernalia
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in
addition to all other logically relevant factors, should consider:
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its
use;
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object,
under any state or federal law relating to a controlled substance;
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this
chapter;
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substance;
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object;
(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object concerning its
use;
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use;
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use;
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale;
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate supplier
of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer
of tobacco products;
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to the total
sales of the business enterprise;
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the community;
(13) whether the object is subject to Section 58-37a-5; and
(14) expert testimony concerning its use.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (West Supp. 2011). Unlawful acts
(l)(a) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store,
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter.
(b) Any person who violates Subsection(l)(a) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(2) (a) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act.l
(b) Any person who violates Subsection(2)(a) is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or older who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person younger than 18 years of age and who is three years or more younger
than the person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) (a) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia.
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(5)(a) A person may not be charged with distribution of hypodermic syringes as
drug paraphernalia if at the time of sale or distribution the syringes are in a
sealed sterile package and are for a legitimate medical purpose, including:
(i) injection of prescription medications as prescribed by a practitioner; or
(ii) the prevention of disease transmission.
(b) A person may not be charged with possession of hypodermic syringes as
drug paraphernalia if the syringe is unused and is in a sealed sterile package.
(6) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section,
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this
chapter.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-402 (West 2004). Separate offenses arising out of single
criminal episode —Included offenses
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall
be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and
sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such
provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense.
An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of
the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court
on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to
support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence
to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily
found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of
conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if
such relief is sought by the defendant.
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instructions?

2

THE COURT:

3

they're right there.

4

MS. RANSON:

5

THE COURT:

6

.MS. RANSON:

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. RANSON:

Chris has them, I think.

Your Honor, if I may approach.
Sure.
This is all in my original submission.
Thank you.
But I thought it would be easier if we just

THE COURT:

11

MS. RANSON:

12

the alternative one in the —•

13

THE COURT:

14

I

MS. RANSON:

15

1

THE COURT:

Okay.
Also, in the event the State has this or

Oh, right.
In their set.
I have those here marked as an alternative,

either testifies or doesn't testify, so I do have those.

17

MS. RANSON:

Okay.

I just wanted to (inaudible) ease of

the Court.

19

THE COURT:

All right.' Thank you.

Okay.

So we

20

have the lesser incl uded, the paraphernalia and then reckless

21

(inaudible) so all c f these are related, then, to a lesser

22

included offense, th en; is that right?

23

MS. RANSON:

24

THE COURT:

25

j

Thank you.

10

18

I guess

have a fresh copy.

•9

16

Yeah.

Yes.
All right.

So do you want to address that,

then?
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- M S . RANSON:

Yes, your Honor.

I think based on the

2

evidence it's reasonable that the jury could come back with a

3

lesser included offense as to whether or not he knew he possessed

4

heroin as the State's charging, or whether or not he knew he

5

possessed paraphernalia as I'm requesting the Court to instruct.

6

On the instructions that- I've given the Court there they

7 I include a definition of paraphernalia, which includes substances
8

to ingest it into the body.

The testimony is pretty clear from

9

the officers that this is used as part of the ingestion of the

10

heroin.

11

would, be, "I may or may not have a needle on me," that they've

12

presented.

13

consideration for what the substance actually is.

14 |

I think that the only intent evidence that the State has

So I would ask the Court to offer this to the jury in

I believe that there is State vs. Carruth -- the Court's

15

probably familiar with it -- allows a defendant to put in a

16

lesser included based on the facts, even if the elements are

17

different than the charged crime.

18

Also, one of the items in here is instruction that they

19

do not have to find him not guilty of the charged offense before

20

finding or considering the lesser included offense.

21

vs. Powell.

22

to instruct them to find that he has to be found not guilty on

23

one before they move on to the other.

That's State

I believe it's established that it would be improper

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. PEAD:

Okay.

Thank you.

Mr. Pead?

Thank you, your Honor.

I hope I can remember
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everything I wanted to say.

2

go to knowing and intentional, I think the evidence speaks for

3 I itself.

Regarding the evidence that would

I don't think it's limited to the needle.

I think

4

the fact that the case was in his pocket goes to knowing and

5

intentional, and yet the mens rea for paraphernalia is the exact

6

same, except it has the additional reckless state of mind.

7

don't think the evidentiary considerations on that aspect are

8

even relevant because there is more evidence than just the

9

needle.

10

So I

In reviewing the case law that surrounds lesser

11

includeds, there's a two step process.

12

it needs to be contained within the other crime, and your Honor,

13

I'm looking at State vs. Kruger that goes over these standards.

14

That could be either that it's an attempt, that it's been

15

specifically found to be a lesser included, such as DUI

16

metabolite to DUI, or that it could be proof by the same facts.

17

The first process is that

I think Ms. Ranson is correct that in this case the same

18

facts that prove possession of controlled substance could prove

19

possession of paraphernalia.

20

second step, which is that in order for the lesser included

21

offense to be included, there has to be a reasonable -- or there

22

has to be a reason that the jury would find the defendant not

23

guilty of the main charge and yet guilty of the lesser included.

24
25

I think, however, I differ on the

In this case I don't think we have that.

I don't think

there's any reason for the jury to find the defendant not guilty
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of possession of a controlled substance and yet find him guilty

2

of possession of paraphernalia.

Truthfully, I think that

• 3

allowing the lesser included in this case •— and I know there

4

are cases where clearly that could be the case, but in a case

5

like this where it's up to the prosecutor to decide what is

6

charged and what is prosecuted would be infringing on what our

7 J job is is to decide what would be charged, and then we have to
8

prove it.

So for those reasons I would ask the Court to exclude

9

the lesser included offense in the instructions.

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. RANSON:

Okay.

Thank you.

Ms. Ranson?

Your Honor, I believe as to the second

12

point as to whether there's a reasonable basis that the jury

13

could not find, that's obviously going to be left to the jury;

14

the same facts could support both crimes.

15

fact that there is a question as to the intent offers us the

16

opportunity for a lesser included to be put before the jury.

17

THE COURT:

Thank you.

I think the very

In this case the only —

well,

18

there's clearly some paraphernalia involved, but the heroin

19

itself is not paraphernalia.

20

substance is is that it's heroin.

21

paraphernalia.

22

contact lens case, but they're not heroin.

23

The only evidence of what the brown
There's no evidence that it's

I mean we do have the cotton ball, we have the

The prosecution could have certainly added an offense in

24

this case.

It would be an added offense pertaining to the cotton

25

and the contact lens case, but they decided not to do that. .
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They gave Mr. Campbell the benefit of that by just charging him

2

with the 3rd Degree Felony.

3

In this case the Court cannot conclude that the —

4

possession of heroin would have a lesser included offense of

5

possession of heroin residue because it's still heroin.

6

residue is heroin.

7

lesser included offense.

8
9

It's not paraphernalia.

that

It's

—

So it's not really a

So while I suppose the prosecution could try to
amend, possibly the defense would object adding in a Class B

10

Misdemeanor, that has not been done.

11

included offense presented that has the same elements -- some of

12

the same elements of the greater offense, to wit possession of

13

heroin —

14

lesser included offense would be denied.

15

So there being no lesser

excuse me -- the request for the instruction on the

I will note that I did not give these instructions, that

16

the request to give them was denied, so they will be part of the

17

record and that issue will be preserved, if you'd like to present

18

that.

19

Now was there anything else that we wanted to cover

20

before your lunch recess?

Okay.

Why don't we just come back

21

then at a quarter til.

22

quarter til, we'll bring the jury in, and then you can decide if

23

Mr. Campbell is going to testify or not, and then we'll take it

24

from there, okay?

25

recess.

If you could be here promptly at a

All right.

Thank you very much.

We'll be in
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-148Now you've also been instructed on beyond reasonable
doubt.

What that really means, I really like the language in the

instruction that the Judge gave you is that you need to be firmly
convinced.

Now we don't have a mind reading machine.

Certainly

that would make your jobs easier, but considering the attendant
circumstances here, the fact that the heroin was in his pocket
and the comment on the needle, I can't imagine that you would be
firmly convinced of anything else.

So at this time I ask you to

find the defendant guilty of possession of a controlled
substance. Thank you.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MS. RANSON:

Ms. Ranson, the defense?

All right.

Good afternoon.

Those of you

hoping that this would be fast, I think you've gotten your wish.
Sorry.
I'd like to echo Mr. Pead's statement.
grateful for you to be here.
paying attention.

We're grateful that you've been

It's very important to us.

important to my client.

We are very

It's very

It's what makes this whole system work.

This has been a short trial, but this is a serious
matter, and you have before you a serious job.

The issue is

clear, it's did Mr. Campbell know that he was possessing heroin.
We're talking about a cotton ball.

You've seen the evidence.

The question is left did he know and what did the State prove?
Now the constitution gives him a number of rights as a
defendant in a criminal matter.

He has a right to a trial.
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has a right to a fair impartial jury.

2

testify, and he has a right to be presumed innocent until he's

3

proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

4

He has a right not to

So taking those one by one, the right to the trial.

5

has the right to have the trial.

6

exercising that right.

We're all here.

We're —

He
he's

He has the right to hear the witnesses,

7 J and we've heard those witnesses.

A fair impartial jury, you were

8

all chosen this morning for that particular reason, that everyone

9

here thought you could be fair, you could be impartial and that

10

you could decide this case based on what was in front of you.

11

A third right I just mentioned is the right not to

12

testify.

13

separate set -- this is very important.

14 I testify.
15
16

If you turn No. 19-A in the packet -- I think it's a

He did not testify.

He has a right not to

The instruction is very clear, you

cannot hold that against him.
Now it's normal to want to know more.

It's normal to

17

want to hear both sides, okay, but the way it works in this

18

context is that that's not his job.

19

if he didn't answer your questions, that doesn't mean that he's

20

failed you, it means the State has failed.you.

21

outstanding questions, that's not his burden.

Remember that you

22

can't hold that against him.

. .

23

It's the State's job.

So

If you have

He has the right to be presumed innocent until you find

24

him guilty.

You would find him guilty if you had found that the

25

State had proved every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
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-150narrowed this down for you.

We're talking about whether or not

he knew it was there, and the State needs to prove that beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Now beyond a reasonable doubt, there's an instruction in
there -- I believe it's instruction No. 3, if you want to follow
along, talking about reasonable doubt.

Just to kind of reference

this for voU; to olace this kind of on a scale, in law, I should
say, there's three different burdens of proof, okay.
one that we have is preponderance of evidence.
case.

The lowest

That's in a civil

I don't remember if any of you had served on a civil case,

but what they're talking about when' they're talking about a
preponderance is 50/50, who is a little bit more right than the
other, okay.
Then the next higher standard we have is clear and
convincing, which is whether the evidence is clear, whether the
evidence is convincing as to whatever they're trying to prove.
Usually that's what's held —

or usually that's the standard when

the State is trying to take custody of somebody's children.
can't just walk in.

They

They have to prove by a clear and convincing

standard that something's gone wrong.
Then at the highest top of this, the top of this pyramid
you have this highest level, and that's beyond a reasonable
doubt, which is proof that has to leave you firmly convinced.
Now it's not, as the instruction says, all doubt.

I mean there's

a chance, yes, that you know, cows could walk on the moon and
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-151take over the planet.

It's not every eventuality, okay, but it

is a careful consideration of the evidence and whether or not
based on that evidence, if there is any reasonable possibility
that he could have committed this, then that would be a doubt
that would go in his favor.
Now I'm going back to this State having the burden idea.
Your sole job as jurors is to hold them to that.

I told you that

at the beginning, I'm telling you it again now, it's your job to
make sure that they've proved it.

You're what stands between

people and an overzealous prosecution, if that were the case.
You're basically the last line of defense here, is that we're
making sure that the State is proving their case to the level
that the law requires that they do.
Again, if you're not convinced, it means the State
didn't do its job and you need to find the defendant not guilty.
If you still have questions left over, things that would have
helped you make your decision, it's because the State didn't do
its job.

If you have doubts, you have to give the defendant the

benefit of those doubts and find him not guilty.
Now going to instruction No. 7 and 8, if you'll —
lists the elements.

No. 7

Mr. Pead went through those with you.

Looking at elements No. 4, 5, and 6, there's -- in connection
with. No. 8, No. 8 says that a defendant needs -- or excuse me,
the statements show that there was a conduct, a criminal conduct
and a criminal mental state.

If you're looking at instruction
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-152No. 7, the conduct would be the possession of a substance called
heroin, the mental state would be intentionally or knowingly.
Now it's very clear, it's not enough to just have the
conduct.

The State would like you to simply infer the knowledge

from the conduct, but I would encourage you to consider that
these are two separate things that they need to show you.

It's

two separate things that they need to prove.
For possession of a controlled substance, like I said,
the conduct at issue -- the criminal conduct would be possessing
the drug, but they still have to show the mental state.
Intentionally, I believe that's instruction No. 9.
conscious plan to act a certain way.

It means a

Knowingly means that you're

aware of the conduct, you're aware of the circumstances.
Now -- okay, I don't know if you all remember this.
Maybe two or three years ago there was —

it was all over the

news how like 90 percent of American money has cocaine on it,
which is an outrageous amount.
for example.

Say you get one of those bills,

You've possessed a measurable amount, you've

possessed a trace amount.

But intent -- the intent element is

what would save you there, okay.

If you didn't intend, if you

didn't know that you had that, you would be not guilty of any
crime, and that's why the mental state thing is such a big '
difference, okay, and that's why I really ask you to make sure
that the State has proven that.

We would argue that the State

did not.
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Instruction No. 11 tells you some of the things that the

2

State can look at to show mental state, what Mr. Campbell did,

3

what he said, other evidence showing what's in his mind, okay.

4

There's no evidence of any statements that Mr. Campbell made

5

about the cotton ball.

6

made regarding heroin at all.

7 J needle.

There's no evidence of any statements
There was some talk about a

No needle was ever found.

No needle was ever tested.

8

As the State has already conceded, there are legal uses, legal

9

reasons to have a needle, and you don't have any evidence .

10

otherwise.

11

Further, there's no evidence of a conscious plan of

12

action here.

13

in his pocket.

14

recently or ever.

15

no evidence of any actions by the defendant to hide what he had.

16

The testimony was that Ms. Peterson, the other person that was in

17

the —

18

officers moved in.

19

there.

20

There's no evidence regarding how that came to be
There's no evidence that he had used heroin then,
That's never been presented to you.

was present, dove across the room.

She moved really fast,

The evidence was that Mr. Campbell just stood

There's no evidence that he had actually used it or any

21

other drugs.

22

him, so there was no evidence of that.

23

no evidence that he —

24

that it was heroin.

25

There's

The officers testified that they did not drug test
Put quite simply, there's

that's been placed before you that he knew

To show that it's heroin it's been very clear from what
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we've been doing here today that it's not enough for somebody

2

just the average person —

3

asking that you infer the mental state, but the State to show to

4

you that it was heroin had to bring in officers —

5

who have been well trained in drug interdiction, drug

6

recognition, the way drugs are used.

to look at it and see.

—

The State's

two officers

One officer had over four

7 ! years of experience, one had over 12 years of experience. They're
8

highly trained individuals.

9

On top of those officers, the State needed to bring the

10

crime lab lady, Mandy Van Buren.

11

bachelor's degree and a master's degree, so something -- at least

12

six or seven years of education, not to mention the specialized

13

training that she did at the crime lab in order to be able to do

14

this.

15

involves chemicals, a machine that I cannot pronounce.

16

very specific and very scientific in the manner in which she goes

17

about this.

18

know, and there's been no evidence presented why Mr. Campbell

19

would ever know anything more than the other average person.

20

Mandy Van Buren has, what, a

Then there's the specialized testing that they do that
She's

This is more than just the average person would

Now also (inaudible) go back to what the other officer's

21

testimony was, both officers were very clear that in the context

22

of heroin usage a cotton ball is used to strain out contaminants.

23

They both said it.

24

contaminants, to ingest the heroin and leave behind the other

25

stuff.

Strain out the impurities, strain out the

He explained that it comes packaged in a different
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1551

manner, and that this is something that's part of how it's iused,

2

the purpose being to s train <Dut the drugs —

3

impurit ies, inject the drugs and leave the junk behind.

4

You've looked at it

"

strain out the

It looks li ke a dirty cotton ball.

5

There's just simply no evidence that Mr. Campbell knew any more

6

than that.

7

very technical.

8

you as well.

9

is tiny.

Even the crime lab evidence, you heard this, it was
She explained it to me.

Hopefully that helped

She's looking at this on a molecular level, which

She's -- and she explained to us that it wasn't a

10

weighable amount.

11

separate from the cotton ball.

12

and this is after she does her very specific scientific testing.

13

It wasn't an amount that she could even
It was a low level amount found,

Folks, you've heard the evidence.

You've heard what's

14

been placed before you.

15

the State has the burden, and hold them to that.

16

important.

17

discuss the case, think about what you've heard and what you

18

haven't heard.

19

It's better to hold to your true opinion than to cave, to come to

20

a resolution so you can go home, okay.

21

Remember that the constitution says that

When you retire to deliberate, listen to each other,

At the end, if you can't agree, that is okay.

The ball is in your court.

You have a very serious job

22

to do at this point.

23

guilty, and we do thank you for your attention.

24

It's very

THE COURT:

We'd ask you to find the defendant not

Thank you very much.

Mr. Pead, any rebuttal

argument?
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